Student chat

Abortion: Morality, Policy & Viability

Privacy Notice: Student names have been replaced with pseudonyms to protect privacy. The audio is AI-generated narration, not the students’ voices. Emoji reactions are illustrative. Plain transcript.

01Chat transcript

Guide

👋 Welcome, everyone!

Our topic is Abortion. We'll be discussing this statement:

In most cases, abortion is morally permissible and should be legal.

Josephine agrees with the statement.
Joshua disagrees with the statement.

My name is Guide, and I'm here to support your discussion. If you need anything, start your message with "Hey Guide" 🤓

Joshua

Hi! This was a hard one for me to give an opinion for because I was really stuck between "slightly disagree" and "slightly agree". My moral convictions really differ from my thoughts on the legality of abortion. From a personal standpoint, I'm religious, so it's hard for me to say that abortion is "morally permissible" in most cases. I definitely agree with you that abortion should be legal, but that said I believe there need to be restrictions. Victims of rape and incest should 100% be able to get an abortion. I also know that many people get abortions because they're not in a position to take on the responsibility and stress of parenthood and bringing a life into the world, and I'm supportive of those individuals getting abortions as well. I believe there needs to be a gestational cutoff. Some of these states, like Iowa, that ban abortions once fetal heart activity is detected (6 weeks), don't seem realistic because people usually don't even know that they're pregnant that early. I'm supportive of a more permissive cutoff because abortion is a huge decision that should be taken seriously. If I could create policy, I'd say 25 weeks would be a good cutoff because the majority of fetuses would be viable at that point. Abortion is a complicated topic because a lot of people have trouble separating their moral convictions and their legal opinions. It gets dangerous once we let individual personal ideologies interfere with policymaking that affects everyone. I also don't like the idea of men making restrictive decisions that affect women's bodies. For me, I might not think abortion is completely morally permissible, but I still think people who are facing the reality of an unwanted pregnancy deserve to have the choice to end it (with restrictions). I'm not an absolutist and I think we as a society need to show people more grace and compassion when it comes to the issue of abortion. Looking forward to hearing your perspective :)

about a week later

Josephine

Thank you for creating such a thoughtful and nuanced response to start the conversation! I really appreciate your honesty about the tension between your personal moral convictions and your views on policy. I feel that having that kind of self-awareness is actually really important in medicine, as we'll constantly be navigating the space between our own values and what's best for our patients.

Josephine

I want to start by saying I think we actually agree on more than it might seem. You've acknowledged support for abortion access in a wide range of circumstances (rape, incest, financial hardship, unpreparedness for parenthood), and you've pushed back against overly restrictive gestational limits like Iowa's six-week ban. To me, that position is already pretty close to what I'd call morally permissible in practice, even if the framing feels different to you. I'd offer the counterpoint on the idea that abortion isn't morally permissible in most cases. I strongly feel that bodily autonomy is one of the most fundamental moral principles we have, and as furture physicians, we're going to encounter this constantly. All of what we have been discussing in class, including informed consent, the right to refuse treatment, and patient autonomy, are the cornerstones of medical ethics. It seems difficult to uphold those principles in every other context and then carve out an exception when it comes to pregnancy. A person's right to determine what happens to and inside their own body is, in my view, a deeply moral position, not just a legal or political one.

Josephine

I also think it's worth considering the medical realities here. As you pointed out, a six-week ban is essentially a near-total ban because most people don't even know they're pregnant yet. From a clinical standpoint, early abortion is an extraordinarily safe procedure. When we withold safe medical care from patients, that has moral weight too. The harm caused by restricted access causes measurable moral harms that have to be factored into any serious ethical analysis. I think that your point about the 25-week cutoff is a reasonable and thoughtful position, and it aligns fairly well with the concept of viability. I'd just add that even late-term abortions, which are statistically rare, are almost always performed in tragic circumstances like in the case of severe fetal anaomalies or serious risks to the mother's health or life. These are devastating situations where familites are already suffering, and I think those cases derserve the utmost compassion rather than criminalization. That's why many physicians and ethicitsts argue that these decisions are best left entirely tot eh patient and their doctor, rather than encoded into a fixed legal cutoff.

Josephine

You made a point I completely agree with: that it becomes dangerous when personal ideology drives policy that affects everyone. I think that's exactly why the moral permissibility of abortion, as a general principle, matters. If we accept that abortion can be morally permissible, then we protect the ability of individuals to make that call for themselves without shame or legal penalty. I really respect that you lead your point with grace and compassion, and I think that's exactly the right instinct. I just believe that compassion, taken to its full conclusion, supports trusting people to make their own deeply personal decisions about their bodies and their lives. Looking forward to continuing our conversation!

Joshua

Thank you for sharing your thoughts, and I appreciate you taking the time to really read and understand my position. I agree with you that our perspectives do align in many ways! I think an important distinction to be made in discussions like these is that between morality and ethics. While ethics is the structure that guides our professional decision-making, morality is based in individual beliefs that differ from person to person and can be influenced by a wide variety of factors (religion, culture, etc.) It's possible for something to be ethically justifiable in a professional/legal framework while still being morally uncomfortable or contested on a personal level. Everyone has different moral parameters, which is why I don't believe there is a way for our society to form a moral consensus on abortion.

Guide

Joshua, this is a really sharp distinction you're drawing between morality and ethics. But I want to push you on it a bit, because I think it might be doing more work than it can actually support.

You're suggesting that ethics can guide professional and legal frameworks while morality remains personal and contested. That makes intuitive sense in some contexts. But here's the tension: the original statement we're discussing explicitly uses the word "morally permissible," not just "ethically justifiable" or "should be legal." You agreed that abortion should be legal in many circumstances, and you've acknowledged it's ethically sound in a professional medical context. So what's left that makes it morally impermissible in your view?

Put differently: if you believe abortion is the right choice for rape victims, for people facing financial hardship, and for those unprepared for parenthood — and you support their legal right to make that choice — what moral principle are you invoking that still renders those abortions morally wrong? Is it that you personally wouldn't choose abortion, or is it that you think others are doing something wrong even though they should be allowed to do it?

I'm curious how you're separating those layers.

Joshua

I fully agree with you that bodily autonomy is a central principle when it comes to abortion, and I certainly think early abortion is ethically defensible on the basis of prioritizing patient autonomy. However, pregnancy is an ethically unique situation because it involves two morally relevant interests. It is much easier to evaluate the ethical importance of autonomy for a pregnant patient because they are very obviously a human being. As a pregnancy progresses, many individuals and systems assign increasing moral weight to the fetus, and it can be difficult to determine the ethical framework to use when it comes to a potential life. Rather than focusing on the question of when a fetus "becomes a life", which is deeply rooted in moral disagreement, I think a more useful question is: at what point should increasing moral consideration be incorporated into ethical decision-making? This is why I'm personally supportive of a 25-week cutoff for abortion that actually accounts for gestational viability. I believe that policy for abortion should reflect the shifting ethical weight that occurs as pregnancy progresses. Viability, a measure of capability of physiological function, serves as a practical threshold for when the fetus might begin to have independent moral consideration. At that point, principles like beneficence, non-maleficence, and even bodily autonomy for the fetus would begin to carry more weight.

Joshua

I agree with your thoughts on the safety of early abortion and the harm of restricted access. Where I differ is whether that justifies removing most or all limits. When it comes to legislation on abortion, the intent should be safety and compassion rather than penalization. That said, without a legal framework, there is a risk of elevating autonomy above all other ethical considerations in a context where multiple principles are in competition. I think a structured approach that reflects both patient autonomy and the increasing moral consideration of the fetus is a more ethically consistent way to approach policy. Looking forward to hearing more of your thoughts!

a few days later

Josephine

I appreciate you grounding your point in a more graduated moral framework rather than a binary, but I do want to add a counterpoint to the idea you brought up regarding viability specifically: it's technologically contingent in a way that is inherently philosophically unstable. The gestational age at which a fetus can survive outside of a uterus has already shifted as advances continue to be made in neonatal care, and it will likely continue to shift, which means we'd be anchoring moral consideration to the current limits of our ICUs rather than to anything intrinsic to fetal development. I'd also distinguish between biability and moral status more carefully, as a neonate is no more capable of independent survival than a previable fetus, yet we don't use that as the basis for neonatal moral considerations. I am not sure that viability is doing the ethical work you need it to do. If we both accept that moral weight increases along a continuum, I think that actually undermines the case for a single legislative cutoff and points more toward a framework of graduated clinical and ethical oversight. I believe this is how most complex medical decisions are already handled. It's also worth reiterating that late-term abortions represent a small percentage incompatible with life or serious maternal health complications, so the population we're discussing and legislating around at that gestational age is largely one facing devastating diagnoses rather than elective decisions. I agree the goal should be compassion rather than penalization, but I'd argue that rigid statutory cutoff (25 weeks as you mention), however well-intentioned, tends to fail exactly that vulnerable population of women.

Joshua

You're right that viability isn't a perfect or purely intrinsic time marker, but in policy, we often have to rely on imperfect but practical thresholds. I'm not arguing that viability determines moral status either; rather, that it serves as a clinically meaningful milestone where competing ethical considerations become harder to ignore. While a fully individualized framework is the most ethical option in theory, legislation still requires some degree of structure to ensure consistency, equity, and protection. Even in many European countries, where healthcare systems tend to be more progressive, late-term abortions are not permitted unless there is a serious fetal anomaly or a threat to the mother's health. I agree that these cases are devastating, which is why the policy framework that I'm describing includes the aforementioned exceptions. While late-term abortions overall are rare, I don't believe that infrequency should be a metric when it comes to creating legislation. Without firm legal boundaries, access and decision-making may become inconsistent across providers and institutions, which raises concerns about equity and standardization of care. In the same vein, though rare, late-term abortions outside of fetal anomalies and threat to life do occur, and I believe it is reasonable to include legal boundaries to respond to these situations. We've agreed that moral weight exists along a continuum, but translating that into policy still requires defined thresholds to ensure consistency. I believe that laws surrounding abortion should be designed to prioritize maternal health and well-being while also taking into account the increasing moral weight of the fetus as gestation progresses. I think a general viability-based framework, with clearly defined medical exceptions, offers a practical way to translate competing principles into policy.

Guide

Josephine, Joshua just made a pretty direct challenge to your position. They're arguing that even if viability is imperfect, some legal threshold is necessary for consistency and equity — and that leaving decisions entirely to clinical judgment risks inconsistent access and standards of care.

How do you respond to that concern? If there's no statutory cutoff at all, what prevents the kind of variability Joshua is worried about? And do you think the European model they referenced (permissive early access, restrictions later with exceptions) actually contradicts your view, or is it compatible with it?

Josephine

I'd like to start by separating two things that are getting conflated: the need for "some" regulatory structure and the need for a "statutory gestational cutoff" specifically. I'd argue you can achieve consistency and equity through standardized clinical ethics processes, institutional review frameworks, and clear documentation requirements without encoding a hard cutoff in law. In fact, that's close to how we handle other complex end-of-life and high-stakes medical decisions, where we don't legislate a single threshold but instead mandate structured oversight. On the European model, I'd actually argue it's more compatible with my position: those systems work well precisely because they pair later restrictions with robust early access, strong social support, and genuinely broad medical exceptions interpreted by clinicians rather than courts and politicians. This is meaningfully different from the US context where "exceptions" have repeatedly been interpreted so narrowly that physicians have delayed care for patients with sepsis out of legal fear.

Joshua

I fully agree with you about the importance of structured clinical oversight in medicine, but significant variations in institutions, resources, access, and even between clinical ethics committees creates the possibility for inconsistent outcomes. Baseline legal parameters and a structured system help ensure equity and consistency when individual assessment can be variable and difficult to standardize. Even in many end-of-life decisions, such as medical aid in dying (MAID), which require immense clinical judgment and oversight, there is still legislation in place designed to protect both patients and providers. Additionally, end-of-life decisions primarily center on a single patient's autonomy, where pregnancy introduces two competing ethical considerations, which makes purely process-based frameworks harder to standardize. With regard to our discussion on the European model, I notice that you strongly agree with their design, and I raise you the point that the European model is largely based on a gestational cut-off for abortion, with certain medical exceptions that we have both agreed are non-negotiables. I agree with your concern about what has happened in the US, but I view that as more of a failure of poorly written and inconsistent laws than an argument against having any legal structure at all. I'd argue that having legal parameters with exceptions that can be broadly interpreted actually favors clinical judgment and empowers providers to support the health needs of their patients. As I've mentioned, I don't believe absolutism with no exceptions to be the solution. I also view a model solely governed by individual oversight and discretion as being somewhat idealized and difficult to implement in a medical world with diverse institutions and systems. Generally, I support a model that has a baseline legal framework but protects patients and providers by providing space for clinical discretion. I'm curious to know your opinion on whether you believe any baseline legal framework with regard to abortion is necessary, or if clinical oversight alone is sufficient.

Josephine

You do make a compelling case, and I think that we're closer to agreement than it might seem. The real disagreement isn't whether any legal structure should exist, but whether a gestational cutoff specifically is the right instrument. I'd concede that some baseline legal framework is necessary, particularly to protect providers and ensure minimum standards of access, but the post-Dobbs landscpe is exactly why I am skeptical that gestational cutoffs reliably do what we want tem to do in practice: what gets written as a "viability cutoff with broad exceptions" in theory has repeatedly been interpreted and enforced in ways that paralyze providers, delay care for criticially ill patients, and expose physicians to criminal liability for using their clinical judgment. This isn't just poor legal drafting but rather a reflection of the reality that abortion legislation exists in a deeply politicized environment where "broadly interpreted exceptions" get litigated into near non-existence at the state level. On the medical aid in dying comparison, I think it actually illustrates my concern rather than resolving it. MAID legislation varies enormously by states and has been used to restrict access as much as protect it, and crucially, as you note, it governs a single patient's autonomy without the added complexity of politically contested fetal moral status being encoded into the law itself. I think it is genuinely idealistic to believe that a gestational cutoff law, however carefully written, can be made immune to that kind of erosion.

Guide

Joshua, Josephine just made a significant concession — she's acknowledged that some baseline legal framework may be necessary. But she's arguing that gestational cutoffs specifically are the wrong tool because they get weaponized in practice, even when written with exceptions.

Do you think there's a version of legal structure that could achieve your goals without relying on a gestational cutoff? Or do you believe the cutoff itself is essential, and if so, why can't the problems Josephine describes be solved through better drafting or enforcement rather than abandoning the threshold altogether?

Joshua

As do you, and I've really appreciated our discussion. I agree that we share many of the same thoughts and concerns when it comes to such a nuanced issue. I certainly agree with you that post-Dobbs realities show how laws can be interpreted in ways that constrain care and create legal risks for providers. When abortion decisions are left up to individual states, we've unfortunately been able to see in real time the devastating effects of inconsistent legal frameworks. Your point that a gestational cut-off can be weaponized is certainly a fair one, but I'm also concerned that a baseline legal infrastructure based mainly on individual judgment would also be at high risk for the same types of litigation and pushback you mentioned for my proposition. It's hard for me to imagine that provider judgment could acceptably be written into federal law when we live in such a litigious society that punishes inconsistency. For abortion, MAID, and many other highly contested medical issues, I believe that legislation becomes inequitable at the state level due to many people's deeply entrenched moral attitudes, and even at the federal level, we've seen in our lifetime that legal interpretation is shaped by broader societal and moral divisions. It's very clear that we both view abortion as a topic has become over-politicized to the point that patients are genuinely harmed. We've also agreed that a baseline legal framework is necessary to protect patients and providers while creating equitable access. I don't believe that a gestational cut-off solves everything, but some level of defined structure while explicitly protecting clinical judgment is the best way I can imagine to realistically achieve the ideas I've expressed.❤️

Josephine

I think that we have actually landed in a really similar place when it comes down to it. Even if we started this discussion from different starting points on the question of moral permissibility. I respect that your religious framework makes that a more complex personal question for you than it is for me. I feel like we have managed to find common ground on what good policy should actually look like. We both agree that bodily autonomy is central and that whatever framework exists should be built around compassion and protecting patients and providers, not just used for punishment. Our real disagreement has been about the mechanism: you're more confident that a carefully structured gestational framework with protected clinical exceptions can hold up in practice, and I seem to be slightly more skeptical that any legal structure can be made resistant to political erosion, given what we have watched unfold regarding reproductive policy in the past few years. I'll concede that some legal baseline is necessary, and you've acknowledged that cutoffs can be weaponized against the patients they're meant to protect. At the end of the day, I think we care about the same things, and that's a much better starting point than most people in a debate about this complicated topic have.👍

Joshua

I agree, and it's refreshing to find common ground on such a contentious topic. I respect that someone who has a strong moral code independent of religion would have very different ideas on the moral permissibility of abortion, and I want to truly thank you for not demeaning my religious beliefs when navigating my arguments. I too feel like we have worked together to determine the true fundamentals of how abortion policy should look, and have very similar hopes when it comes to protecting all relevant entities in the process. While this was a debate, your thoughts on structured clinical oversight honestly made me really think and re-evaluate my ideas of how abortion legislation should look. I truly hope that future abortion policy can prioritize clinical judgment while also resting on a consistent and supportive legal infrastructure that would not be exploited by those who wish to undermine it. Thank you again for this conversation and for hearing me out despite a difference in opinion. You have a great way of explaining your stance that was truly thought-provoking for me, and it gives me hope that future medical providers will advocate for women's health and policy and hopefully take part in creating a system that is both compassionate and ethical. :)

02Understanding quiz

Sway asks each student five questions about what their partner argued. Scores are accurate. Questions and responses may be updated from time to time to reflect improvements to Sway.

Joshuadisagrees

Understanding Quiz

5 questions about what Josephine argued.

Early in the discussion, how did Josephine argue that abortion could be morally permissible rather than merely legally or professionally acceptable?

She argued that moral judgments should be set aside because professional ethics provide the only workable basis for abortion policy.
She argued that social disagreement makes moral conclusions impossible, so abortion should be defended without making any claim about moral permissibility.
She argued that fetal viability settles the moral question because independent physiological function establishes a clear boundary for moral status.
She argued that bodily autonomy is itself a moral principle, so respecting control over one's body supports abortion on moral as well as legal grounds.

correct Justification

Josephine called bodily autonomy "one of the most fundamental moral principles we have" and said that a person's right to control what happens inside their body is "a deeply moral position, not just a legal or political one." The other choices reflect arguments that you raised or positions she rejected.

When you defended viability as a practical policy threshold, what was Josephine's main challenge to the ethical role you assigned it?

She argued that viability matters clinically but should be placed earlier because most patients discover pregnancy before fetal heart activity begins.
She argued that viability protects equal access but should apply only when a pregnancy involves neither fetal anomaly nor maternal health risks.
She argued that viability reflects fetal moral status but should remain flexible because different hospitals possess different neonatal resources.
She argued that viability shifts with medical technology and is not intrinsic to fetal development, so it cannot securely ground a single moral or legal threshold.

correct Justification

Josephine described viability as "technologically contingent" and said that using it would anchor moral consideration "to the current limits of our ICUs rather than to anything intrinsic to fetal development." She therefore doubted that viability was "doing the ethical work" required of it.

After you argued that clinical discretion could produce inconsistent outcomes, how did Josephine propose achieving consistency without a hard statutory cutoff?

She proposed adopting European gestational limits directly, while leaving early access and social support policies to individual institutions.
She proposed a federal viability rule, uniform criminal penalties, and narrow exceptions reviewed by courts rather than individual clinicians.
She proposed standardized ethics procedures, institutional review, and documentation requirements, similar to oversight used for other high-stakes medical decisions.
She proposed state-specific clinical standards, local ethics committees, and different gestational thresholds based on available neonatal technology.

correct Justification

Josephine explicitly proposed "standardized clinical ethics processes, institutional review frameworks, and clear documentation requirements" instead of "encoding a hard cutoff in law." The other options add legal thresholds, court control, or state variation that she did not advocate.

Toward the end of the discussion, why did Josephine accept some baseline legal framework while remaining skeptical of gestational cutoffs?

She concluded that European restrictions should be copied, but she worried that American institutions lacked enough resources to administer medical exceptions.
She concluded that legal rules establish fetal moral status, but she worried that technological advances would require the cutoff to move frequently.
She concluded that clinical oversight creates unacceptable inconsistency, but she worried that federal courts would reject any nationally uniform gestational standard.
She concluded that legal baselines can protect providers and minimum access, but she worried that politicized enforcement can narrow exceptions and delay critical care.

correct Justification

Josephine conceded that a baseline could "protect providers and ensure minimum standards of access," while arguing that cutoff laws have been interpreted to "paralyze providers, delay care for critically ill patients, and expose physicians to criminal liability." This combination uniquely captures both her concession and her continuing concern.

After Josephine's concession, how did Guide clarify the remaining issue for you to address?

Guide asked whether European abortion systems proved that state-level legislation was more equitable than a single national framework.
Guide asked whether your religious concerns could be translated into a fetal moral-status rule that clinicians would be required to follow.
Guide asked whether your goals required a gestational cutoff itself or could be achieved through another legal structure that protected clinical judgment.
Guide asked whether late-term abortion rates were high enough to justify legal regulation despite the risks created by narrow medical exceptions.

correct Justification

Guide distinguished baseline legal structure from a gestational cutoff and asked whether "a version of legal structure" could meet your goals without one, or whether "the cutoff itself is essential." The other choices were not the clarification Guide posed at that stage.

5 of 5 correct Next

Josephineagrees

Understanding Quiz

5 questions about what Joshua argued.

When you argued that support for autonomy made abortion morally permissible, how did Joshua explain why he could still support access while remaining personally morally uncomfortable?

He argued that bodily autonomy applies early in pregnancy, while religious principles should directly determine later abortion laws.
He argued that legality reflects public opinion, while morality should determine each physician's professional conduct.
He distinguished fetal viability from moral status, saying this distinction resolves the conflict between personal belief and medical ethics.
He distinguished professional ethics from personal morality, saying religious and cultural beliefs can create discomfort even when abortion is ethically defensible.

not quite Justification

Joshua said ethics guides "professional decision-making," while morality is based on individual beliefs influenced by factors such as "religion" and "culture." He therefore held that something can be "ethically justifiable" while remaining "morally uncomfortable" personally.

When Joshua first defended a 25-week cutoff, why did he treat viability as a useful threshold?

He believed viability is technologically stable and therefore avoids disagreements caused by advances in neonatal medicine.
He believed viability identifies when abortions generally stop involving fetal anomalies or threats to maternal health.
He believed viability proves that fetal moral status is equal to the pregnant patient's moral status at that point.
He believed viability marks possible physiological independence, making growing fetal interests harder to exclude from ethical decisions.

correct Justification

Joshua described viability as "a practical threshold" based on "capability of physiological function" and said that fetal beneficence, non-maleficence, and bodily autonomy would then "begin to carry more weight." He did not claim that viability proves equal moral status.

After you challenged viability as technologically contingent, how did Joshua defend continuing to use it in policy?

He conceded that clinical oversight is valuable but argued that European systems leave later abortion entirely to individual providers.
He conceded that it changes with technology but argued that neonatal dependence makes it an intrinsic measure of fetal moral status.
He conceded that it is imperfect but called it a clinically meaningful milestone that can support a structured rule with medical exceptions.
He conceded that late abortions are rare but argued that rarity itself provides the strongest basis for a statutory restriction.

correct Justification

Joshua said viability "isn't a perfect or purely intrinsic time marker" and does not determine moral status, but it remains "a clinically meaningful milestone." He defended a "general viability-based framework, with clearly defined medical exceptions."

When you proposed standardized clinical review instead of a statutory cutoff, what was Joshua's main objection to relying on that process alone?

Clinical review would focus too heavily on fetal interests, whereas legislation would give greater priority to maternal autonomy.
Institutional differences could produce unequal outcomes, and pregnancy involves competing interests that are harder to standardize through discretion alone.
Institutional differences could be eliminated through federal funding, but clinical committees would still lack expertise in fetal anomalies.
Clinical review would resemble European policy, whereas American law requires abortion decisions to remain entirely at the state level.

correct Justification

Joshua cited variations in "institutions, resources, access, and even between clinical ethics committees" as sources of inconsistent outcomes. He also contrasted pregnancy's "two competing ethical considerations" with end-of-life decisions centered primarily on one patient's autonomy.

By the end of the discussion, how had your arguments about structured clinical oversight affected Joshua's position?

He abandoned gestational thresholds and concluded that institutional ethics committees should have sole authority over abortion decisions.
He retained his original policy unchanged and said clinical oversight could not realistically protect either patients or medical providers.
He adopted your concern that any legal framework would be politically eroded and therefore rejected federal abortion legislation.
He re-evaluated the design of abortion legislation and placed greater emphasis on protected clinical judgment within consistent legal infrastructure.

correct Justification

Joshua explicitly said your ideas about "structured clinical oversight" made him "re-evaluate" how legislation should look. His final hope combined prioritizing "clinical judgment" with "a consistent and supportive legal infrastructure," rather than abandoning legal structure.

4 of 5 correct Next

03Post-chat survey

Last, both students rate the statement again and then rate a randomly sampled subset of our post-chat survey items. Like their transcripts, individual student opinions are never revealed to instructors.

Joshuadisagrees

Now you’ve had a chance to discuss the topic, rate your level of agreement with the original statement again.

Remember, all responses to Sway surveys are private and never shown to your instructor.

In most cases, abortion is morally permissible and should be legal.

Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	No idea	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree

How much do you agree with each of these?

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Guide's contributions improved the discussion
I felt comfortable sharing my honest opinions with my partner
I was not offended by my partner's perspective
My partner was respectful
This discussion led me to change my mind about something related to the topic
The skills I practiced in this chat will be useful in my conversations outside of Sway

How did this Sway chat affect your confidence discussing complex issues with people who hold different views from you?

It was a valuable experience to discuss this topic with someone who holds a different view.

Submit

Josephineagrees

Now you’ve had a chance to discuss the topic, rate your level of agreement with the original statement again.

Remember, all responses to Sway surveys are private and never shown to your instructor.

In most cases, abortion is morally permissible and should be legal.

Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	No idea	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree

How much do you agree with each of these?

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
Guide's contributions improved the discussion
My partner had better reasons for their views than I expected
This discussion improved my perception of my partner
It would be good if more students and classes used Sway
This discussion led me to change my mind about something related to the topic
The skills I practiced in this chat will be useful in my conversations outside of Sway

Submit

Opinion change

Joshuadisagrees

Josephineagrees

—

before the chat after the chat both, unchanged

Abortion: Morality, Policy & Viability

01Chat transcript

02Understanding quiz

03Post-chat survey

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